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1.  Introduction: Opening the Black Box of Global Corporate Control 
 Over the past 20 years, a widening gulf has appeared between the increasingly 
internationalized financing arrangements of the world’s leading corporations, and the persistence 
of nationally compartmentalized approaches to the study of corporate control.  In what remains 
the most influential and far-reaching study of corporate ownership, La Porta et al. (1999), 
provided a breakdown of ownership patterns in 27 high and middle income economies.  This 
confirmed the existence of a long-suspected divide between dispersed control in “Anglo-
American” economies, and more concentrated control in most other economies.  However, it did 
not shed any light on the international integration of ownership across these economies.  After 
the turn of the millennium, the increasingly inescapable reality of financial internationalization 
forced an adjustment of this approach.  However, rather than an examination of international 
processes of change in their own right, the result has mostly been the production of national case 
studies of corporate ownership internationalization, with a rather narrow conceptual and 
empirical focus.  This focus has nearly always been the breakdown (or stability) of “insider” 
control in “non-Anglo American” economies (however defined), and the intrusion (or exclusion) 
of “outsider” Anglo-American actors and practices purportedly organized around arm’s-length, 
market-oriented lines (Aoki et al. 2007; Clark and Wójcik 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hoepner 
and Krempel 2004; Schmidt 2003; Stulz 2005; Walter and Howie 2011).   
 As noted by Peck and Theodore (2007), these studies are not only rather unsatisfactory in 
their continued adherence to conceptual and methodological nationalism, but in their tendency to 
focus on only the recipients of Anglo-American financial and institutional diffusion.  Meanwhile, 
the Anglo American economies at the heart of global finance are often treated as a black box 
filled with caricatured “liberal” and or “market-based” institutions, which are presumed to act as 
a default template for global restructuring.  As such, mostly missing in studies of ownership 
internationalization is a problematization of the dynamic, heterogeneous, and contested nature of 
historical and contemporary corporate ownership and governance in the Anglo-American 
economies themselves.  In the US alone these arrangements have been argued to run the gamut 
from an “organized capitalist” company network (Lash and Urry 1987); to pure managerialism, 
with minimal shareholder influence (Berle and Means 1999); to the emergence of de facto 
socialism via the growing influence of employee pension funds (Drucker 1976); to a post-1980s 
Wall Street oligarchy, whose power derives from the vortex of speculative securities markets 
(Wray 2011); to an ascendant “fiduciary capitalism” with increasingly centralized control by 
massive asset managers (Hawley and Williams 2000); to the outright death of the publicly-traded 
corporation, and its replacement with shadowy, private organizational forms (Economist 2012: 
2013a).  Likewise excluded in most studies of corporate ownership internationalization is a 
treatment of the influence of non-traditional, and in many cases non-western actors such as 
sovereign wealth funds, which, have been documented to pursue more diverse strategies and 
objectives than conventional institutional investors (Clark et al. 2013; Haberly 2014).   
 Within the past few years, a handful of studies have begun to address these gaps in 
existing research, by directly examining the control of the world economy at the global scale.  
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Peetz and Murray (2012) compile shareholder data on the world’s largest 250 industrial firms by 
turnover, and largest 50 financial firms by assets in 2009.  Among private investors, they find 
that a single American fund manager, BlackRock, controls a staggering 6% of sample firm 
assets.  They also find a substantial presence of state capital in global ownership, with the British 
government the second most influential investor (by portfolio firm assets) after BlackRock, due 
to its recapitalization of banks in the global financial crisis, followed by the government of 
China.  Meanwhile, in a complementary study, Vitali et al. (2011) conducted an exhaustive 
shareholder structure analysis of 43,000 multinational firms worldwide.  In contrast to the focus 
of Peetz and Murray (2012) on aggregate asset totals, this focused on the relational structure of 
global corporate control.  The results were equally striking.  Rather than a juxtaposition of 
decentralized global markets and residual national networks, they indicated that worldwide 
corporate ownership has become organized into a single centralized network, to which 75% of 
sample firms, accounting for more than 94% of sample turnover, are connected.  This network 
has a “strongly connected core” of approximately 1,000, primarily financial firms, which 
exercise control over both one another and a much larger periphery of mostly non-financial 
firms.   
The results of these studies are tantalizing, suggesting that the growing concentration of 
global wealth (Henry 2012; Oxfam 2014; Piketty 2014; Zucman 2015) may be mirrored by a 
growing concentration of corporate control.  However, they in many respects raise more 
questions than they answer.  From an empirical standpoint, their sensitivity to very fine 
connections makes it difficult to distinguish concentrated long-term, from arm’s-length market-
based relationships, and obscures specific structures within a cloud of enormous complexity.  
Moreover, they also raise unanswered conceptual questions.  The analysis of Vitali et al. (2011) 
is entirely empirical.  Meanwhile, Peetz and Murray (2012) theorize global ownership evolution 
in terms of a general tendency towards “financialization.”  This is problematic, as it does not 
differentiate between the qualitative diversity of finance-dominated economic systems.  Indeed, 
the apparent tendency towards shareholder concentration—implying the prevalence of inherently 
illiquid, multibillion-dollar share blocks, which often require years to dispose of—sits uneasily 
with the conventional understanding of “financialization” as entailing a tendency towards 
speculative, market churn.  Similar questions are raised by the apparently growing importance of 
state capital in global ownership.   
 Here we seek to build upon these studies by answering two basic questions.  Firstly, what 
does the global company network look like, in terms of its overall structure, and key actors and 
relationships?  In this respect, in line with previous surveys of national corporate ownership (e.g. 
La Porta et al. 1999), but unlike previous studies of global ownership, we limit ourselves to the 
examination of concentrated shareholdings, which imply some level of long-term commitment.  
Secondly, in light of the diverse and often contradictory theories of national-level corporate 
ownership evolution, how, and to what extent can the emergence of a global company network 
be parsimoniously theorized? 
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 The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections.  In section 2, we examine the 
conceptual basis of global company network formation.  Drawing on Peck and Theodore’s 
(2007) “variegated capitalist” theorization of global capitalist change in terms of a broadly 
Polanyian model of contradictory market institutionalization, we argue that the emergence of the 
global company network can be understood as a counterintuitive product of global financial 
marketization.  In order to understand this emergence, however, it is necessary to extend 
Polanyi’s model of the “double movement” to incorporate Veblenian processes of evolutionary 
institutional change.  By recasting elements of agency theory and the efficient market hypothesis 
in terms of this hybrid “Darwinian Polanyian” conceptualization of the double-movement, we 
show how the global company network has emerged out of a “Veblenian” erosion of liquidity 
and efficiency in the core markets of global finance, combined with the “Polanyian” attempts of 
states to simultaneously engage with and defend themselves from these markets.  As we confirm 
in sections 5-7, the result has been the emergence of a “global network core” centered on a 
handful of enormous money managers in the US and Britain, ringed by a more geographically 
diverse “state capitalist periphery.”  The emergence of this global company network, we argue, 
has relieved some of the most prominent tensions in global financial marketization; however, it 
has also injected new, and in all likelihood more serious stresses into it. 
  
2. The Polanyian and Veblenian Double Movements 
Understanding the ongoing process of global company network formation, we argue, 
requires synthesizing what can be described as the Veblenian and Polanyian institutionalist 
traditions.  In both approaches, institutions are broadly conceptualized in relation to the gulf 
between the abstraction of homo economicus and the reality of human social behavior.  However, 
the role of institutions in relation to this gulf is viewed from different directions.  In his writings, 
Veblen never took the idea of the “self-regulating” market, populated by atomistic rational 
actors, particularly seriously as a driver of real human social organization.  Rather, his primary 
concern was for how habitually reproduced institutional frameworks were shaped over time by 
context-dependent, pseudo-Darwinian selection pressures (Hodgson 2008; Veblen 1898).  
Something vaguely resembling homo economicus, had, according to Veblen, emerged 
organically in the “pecuniary culture” governing the behavior of financiers and high-level 
corporate managers.  However, this culture coexisted uneasily with the other components of a 
complex and diverse socio-economic matrix.  Indeed, in a theory influencing later work on 
corporate governance (e.g. Berle and Means 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976), Veblen argued 
that an increasingly elaborate institutional apparatus had developed to bridge the widening gap 
between the pecuniary principles of the “absentee owners” of modern corporations, and the 
broader organization of modern industrial society around the “machine process” (Veblen 1904; 
1923).   
To a large extent, Veblen’s theory of absentee ownership is one in which institutions 
evolve to protect the market, in the form of pecuniary business principles, from the broader 
developmental logic of industrial society.  Polanyi, in contrast, turned this model of market 
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institutionalization on its head.  Although, equally skeptical of the applicability of the “self-
regulating market” to human society, Polanyi (2001) argued that political attempts to impose this 
ideal nevertheless had dramatic societal impacts, which he described in terms of the operation of 
a “double movement.”  In this dynamic, the advance of the “utopian project” of 19th century 
liberalism was paradoxically sustained by a simultaneous institutional “countermovement,” 
wherein society protected itself from the disruptive influence of the market.  Rather than a 
coherent project, this countermovement developed as an accumulation of partial fixes to what 
were perceived to be disconnected social, economic, and environmental problems.  According to 
Polanyi, the growing weight, and increasingly nationalistic character of the very mechanisms 
(e.g. imperialism, protectionism, trade unionism, universal suffrage, central banking) that 
rendered marketization politically sustainable was “in the last analysis…incompatible with the 
self-regulation of the market, and thus the market itself” (Polanyi 2001, p. 136).  The building 
tension of this paradox would eventually strain the institutional framework of 19
th
 century 
civilization to the breaking point, resulting in its sudden and violent implosion in the early 20
th
 
century.   
There is a strong argument to be made that these two approaches to the conceptualization 
of market institutionalization, in both their original form and contemporary economic geographic 
conceptual legacy, are more complementary than contradictory.  While the focus of Polanyi is 
the role of institutions in protecting society from the market, the institutional supports of markets 
themselves are more extensively dealt by Veblen.  Furthermore, whereas Polanyi’s focus is 
macroscopic ideology and policy, Veblen problematizes emergent evolutionary processes 
mediated at the microscopic level, particularly the firm.  Here we build-on a “Darwinian 
Polanyian” approach (Haberly 2014) to the economic geographic synthesis of these two 
institutionalist traditions, which seeks to realize their complementarities.  In the Polanyian 
tradition, this draws upon the “variegated capitalist” problematization of the contradictory and 
geographically uneven institutionalization of the political project of neoliberal globalization 
(Brenner et al. 2010; Dixon 2011; Lim 2010; Peck and Theodore 2007).  Meanwhile, in the 
Veblenian tradition, it draws upon a Generalized Darwinian approach to the analysis of bottom-
up emergent institutional evolution (Essletzbichler and Rigby 2007; Hodgson 2008). Putting 
these together creates a framework encompassing both political institutional interventions in the 
market, and institutional selection processes mediated through the market (Haberly 2014).  
Beyond the level of theorization, this entails a hybrid macro-micro epistemology, which 
combines attention to top-down policy developments with a population dynamics approach to 
investigating bottom-up actor-level trends. 
Most importantly, for the present discussion, Haberly (2014) identifies a potential for 
market-mediated institutional selection to generate “double-movement”-type patterns of market 
expansion and containment.  However, these are analyzed in terms of their ability to simulate 
politically-mediated Polanyian double movements.1  In contrast, here we theorize market-
                                                          
1
 Specifically the decay and re-formation of “patient capital” sheltering German firms and workers from market 
shocks and investor demands. 
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mediated double-movement dynamics on its own terms, by re-grounding it in Generalized 
Darwinism’s Veblenian institutionalist roots. Our key argument is that a Generalized Darwinian 
approach to the analysis of financial evolution is not simply complementary to a Polanyian 
approach, but also—if conducted in the original spirit of Veblen’s homo economicus critique—
implies a mirror-image logic of contradictory market institutionalization.  We dub this mirror-
image logic the “Veblenian double movement.”  In the Polanyian double-movement, the political 
impulse towards marketization ultimately buckles under the weight of the institutions which 
protect society from the market.  In contrast, in the Veblenian double-movement, a 
predominantly Darwinian evolutionary impulse towards marketization buckles under the weight 
of the institutions which protect the market from society—with “society” understood broadly to 
refer to the entire array of actually-existing human limitations and idiosyncrasies.  As shown in 
figure 1, we argue that the most important bottom-up marketizing impulse, in the context of 
finance, is a “drive to liquidity and efficiency” powered by the investor pursuit of portfolio 
flexibility and arbitrage opportunities.  Meanwhile, the key market-protecting 
“countermovement” sustaining this impulse is the establishment of “monitoring and control 
systems” to manage the “informational and agency dilemmas” intrinsic to financial markets.   
 
Figure 1. Veblenian and Polanyian double-movements in financial marketization 
In contemporary finance, we argue that this Veblenian double-movement conditions 
many (although not all) of the tendencies typically described as “financialization.”  Meanwhile, 
the tendencies towards neoliberalization and globalization are conditioned by more classically 
Polanyian double movements.  These are driven by the impulses of “market discipline 
imposition” and “international opportunity pursuit” on the one hand, and the pressures these 
create for the institutionalized protection of social “security” and national “sovereignty” on the 
other (figure 1).  Importantly, these three double-movements are not independent from one 
another.  Rather, they should be seen as sub-logics within an interconnected web of market 
institutionalization processes, which are conditioned by a common fundamental conflict between 
idealized market-rational and actually-existing human behavior.  The impulses towards 
economic internationalization and liberalization are sometimes separated (e.g. in mercantilism); 
however, they are more often expressions of an overarching laissez faire ideology.  As noted by 
Polanyi (2001 p. 213), moreover, “internal and external, social and national protectionism [tend] 
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to fuse.”  Finally, as we note in the conclusion (and as explored in Haberly 2014), Veblenian and 
Polanyian institutionalization processes may directly contradict or reinforce one another.     
A full exploration of the myriad of such interactions possible is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Rather, the following two sections advance a model of contemporary global network 
formation which focuses on the most relevant core processes.  In section 3, we examine the 
Veblenian double movement in figure 1, and show how it is producing a “global network core” 
of Anglo-American fund managers who supersede, as much as operate within, capital markets.  
Next, in section 4, we show how the two more classically Polanyian double-movements in figure 
1 are, in conjunction with one another, producing a more geographically diverse “state capitalist 
periphery” surrounding this global network core.   
 
3. From Capital Markets to Company Networks 
Contrary to Peetz and Murray’s (2014) interpretation of global ownership concentration 
in terms of the advance of financialization, we argue that the most important motor of global 
company network formation is a structural exhaustion of one of its core tendencies—namely the 
marketizing “drive to liquidity and efficiency” (figure 1).  As noted by Epstein (2005), 
financialization has become an umbrella term for multiple phenomena.  At the macroeconomic 
level, it has been described as an ascendance of “rentier” interests and or “FIRE” sectors 
(Krippner 2005).  Meanwhile, from an institutional standpoint, it typically refers to short-term 
shareholder value-maximizing corporate governance, the ascendance of arm’s-length capital 
markets over relationally tight-knit bank-based financial systems, and the “explosion of financial 
trading and the proliferation of new instruments” (Epstein 2005; Krippner 2005, p. 175).   
The argument here is that not all of these tendencies are intrinsically connected.  Rather, 
contemporary “financialization” is a juxtaposition of at least two impulses.  These first is a risk-
taking/debt-driven escalation of bubble economy tendencies associated with the neoliberal 
dialectic of “discipline and security” discussed in section 4.  Meanwhile, the second—which we 
dub the “drive to liquidity and efficiency”—entails an (all-else-being-equal risk neutral) 
movement of institutional arrangements towards increasing strategic and relational short-
termism, flexibility, and arbitrage.  Broadly speaking, this acts on the position of institutions in 
what varieties of capitalism theorists (Hall and Soskice 2001) have described as the 
“coordinated-liberal” spectrum (which examples such as the Keiretsu-led 1980s Japanese bubble 
economy suggest has little bearing on financialization in the first sense above).  However, it 
constitutes a different dynamic of movement along this spectrum than described by varieties 
theorists.   
Within the varieties literature, the model of institutional change closest to the “drive to 
liquidity and efficiency” is that of spontaneous marketization through self-interested actor 
“defection” (Hall and Thelen 2009) from fixed commitments and relationships.  Indeed, our 
model is congruent with this interpretation of the breakdown of company networks such as 
“Deutschland AG” (Hoepner and Krempel 2004).  However, it also describes a more 
comprehensive tendency towards financial market self-organization.  Most importantly, whereas 
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“defection” views marketization in negative terms, as an erosion of non-market institutions, we 
view it (following Clark and Wójcik 2007) in positive terms as a process of institution-building, 
entailing the development of complex strategies and structures.  Importantly, this conceptual 
inversion creates a basis for theorizing open-ended and ongoing market development in “already-
liberal” (e.g. Anglo-American) financial institutional systems.2  However, it also implies that 
marketization is institutionally costly, and thus tension-ridden on its own pecuniary terms.  The 
result, we argue, is that both networked relationship-based and arm’s-length market-based 
financial institutional arrangements are endogenously unstable.  Geographically, this works 
against the emergence of pure “varieties of capitalism,” rather promoting mixed institutional 
ecologies.
3
  Temporally, this creates a potential for both emergent evolutionary company 
network decay through the direct action of the “drive to liquidity and efficiency,” and emergent 
evolutionary network formation as a reflexive product of this drive’s contradictions.   
These evolutionary tendencies can be understood as a dialectical tug-of-war.  On the one 
hand, all else being equal,
4
 most investors have a preference for liquidity, which can be defined 
as the ease of exit from positions.  For risk-averse investors, this is a strategy of risk reduction
5
; 
meanwhile, for risk-seeking speculative investors, it is a strategy of opportunity-cost reduction, 
enabling the flexible pursuit of opportunities for arbitrage.  By facilitating such arbitrage, and 
thus allowing for the discovery of prices, liquidity in turn becomes the precondition for market 
efficiency; moreover, by creating confidence in the ability of assets to be priced, efficiency in-
turn becomes the precondition for liquidity (Clark and Wójcik 2007).   
Meanwhile, constraining this “drive to liquidity and efficiency” are the limitations of 
actually-existing human honesty and knowledge, which must be overcome through the creation 
of costly “monitoring and control systems” (figure 1).  Specifically, the more fragmented and 
footloose investor holdings become, the greater the difficulty that is entailed in both supervising 
the routine management of portfolio firms (i.e. the agency dilemma), and in constantly 
identifying new opportunities for profitable investment (i.e. the informational dilemma).  To 
date, these two problems have primarily been theorized independently, the former by agency 
theory, and the latter by a number of variants of the efficient market hypothesis.  However, both 
theories are ultimately informed by a similar perspective on the contradictions of market 
institutionalization, within which the institutional cost of marketization is often seen to outstrip 
its benefits.  Given this convergent conceptual outlook, the practical entanglement of efficiency 
and liquidity, and the high degree of overlap between the monitoring and control institutions 
(e.g. securities regulations, investment banks, law firms, asset managers, etc.) created to govern 
both the informational and agency dilemmas, we argue that an evolutionary hybridization of 
agency theory and efficient market hypothesis work is in order.  
                                                          
2
 E.g. ever-increasing securities trading volume, frequency, and complexity, ever-more-impatient investor demands 
for corporate share price and cash remittance maximization, etc. 
3
 See Clark and Wójcik (2007) for a discussion of this heterogeneity.   
4
 The “all else being equal” is crucial here, implying a potential willingness to sacrifice liquidity to increase returns.   
5
 In this respect we are referring to a long-term preference for liquid assets, in contrast to the cyclical flight into cash 
described by Keynesian theory.   
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To date, the evolution of corporate shareholder structure has primarily been theorized 
from the standpoint of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; La Porta et al. 1999; Schliefer 
and Vishny 1997).  Agency theory can be described, more or less, as a reformulation of Veblen’s 
dilemma of “absentee ownership”—or as Berle and Means (1999) described it, the “separation of 
ownership and control”—from the standpoint of shareholders.  According to agency theorists, 
the “state of nature” of corporate ownership is characterized by incestuous, illiquid relationships 
between managers and concentrated long-term shareholders.  It is only through the public and 
private construction of institutions of minority investor protection that more fragmented and 
liquid ownership structures can emerge.  Moreover, as emphasized by Schliefer and Vishny 
(1997), these institutions tend to be inherently imperfect and unstable, with more dispersed 
control arrangements having a constant tendency to collapse into illiquid, concentrated corporate 
ownership; either constituted permanently on a long-term relationship basis, or temporarily via 
activist proxy fights or takeovers in the “market for control.”  Historically, this model has been 
used to explain the emergence of the early 20
th
 century American financial-industrial company 
network, centered on JP Morgan’s “Money Trust,” as a counterintuitive byproduct of securities 
market development (Coffee 2001; De Long 1992).  More recently, Haberly (2014) argues that it 
partially explains a post-2000 surge in family control of German industrial firms.   
We argue that a reversion to illiquid, long-term relationship investing is currently 
occurring within the Anglo-American heart of global securities markets.  However, this is not 
being primarily driven, at present, by the pressures of the agency dilemma.  Rather, the primary 
motor of change is located in the “informational dilemma” of securities market efficiency, which 
has come to drive changes in corporate governance via its impacts on market liquidity.  What we 
dub the informational dilemma has been extensively theorized in debates surrounding the so-
called efficient market hypothesis of market trading structure (Malkiel 2003).  As described by 
Eugene Fama (1995), the basic conundrum of market efficiency—which arguably transcends the 
rational expectations-behaviorism debate (see Lo 2004)
6—is the fact that efficiency is the 
product of costly investor efforts to identify and exploit arbitrage opportunities, yet eliminates 
the arbitrage opportunities that allow investors to underwrite these costs.  Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980), in an influential analysis of this trade-off, describe the resulting “optimal” efficiency 
level in equilibrium terms.  However, in an institutional evolutionary revision of the efficient 
market hypothesis, Lo (2004) notes that investors have no way of telling, except after the fact, 
whether strategies are optimal in a given context.  Consequently, rather than tending towards 
equilibrium, market structures will tend to evolve in an unstable Darwinian manner, in which 
they wander between various states on the efficiency-arbitrage-opportunity spectrum (Lo 2004).   
Since the 1970s, proponents of the so-called “strong” version of the efficient market 
hypothesis have consistently argued that expenditures on price-discovery, by US investors, are 
far in excess of what is justified by the available arbitrage opportunities.  Consequently, the most 
                                                          
6
 A more modest restatement of the efficient market hypothesis, which sidesteps this debate, is the idea that any 
successful stock-picking strategy will—to the extent that it becomes popular—cease to be successful.  Individual 
attempts to beat the market will thus tend to escalate, collectively, into costly and self-defeating informational arms-
races.   
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rational investment approach is to free-ride on the price-discovery efforts of others through a 
passive, index-based strategy (Malkiel 2003; 2005).  Although these arguments were mostly 
ignored until recently, the experience of the financial crisis, combined with a growing body of 
research, has led to a growing disillusionment with ever-higher-cost speculative investment 
strategies (e.g. high frequency trading; Philips 2013), which are increasingly seen to accomplish 
little other than lining the pockets of fund managers and other intermediaries (Coe et al. 2014; 
Dixon and Monk 2014; Malkiel 2005).  The result of this disillusionment has been an 
unprecedented growth of passive index-based investment strategies aimed at minimizing 
informational and transactional overheads (Economist 2014; Malkiel 2013).    
We argue that this Anglo-American turn from speculative to passive investment is the 
single-most important factor driving contemporary global company network formation.  By 
refusing to underwrite the costs of price discovery, passive funds implicitly reduce market 
efficiency.  However, their growth has also had knock-on effects on liquidity, and thus corporate 
governance.  In comparison to actively managed funds, which must avoid becoming so large that 
they move the market (i.e. “asset bloat,” Currier 2007), passive funds have much greater 
economies of scale.  Having underwritten the fixed costs associated with the construction of ICT 
platforms, and the hiring of regulatory compliance staff, AUM can be expanded almost 
indefinitely at very little marginal cost (Economist 2014; MacDonald-Korth et al. 2015; Malkiel 
2013).  Given that the primary rationale for passive investing is the minimization of overhead 
costs, this has encouraged the emergence of a new class of supermassive fund managers such as 
BlackRock, whose $4.7 trillion AUM as of 2015 is larger than the GDP of Germany, and only 
slightly smaller than the GDP of Japan (Economist 2013b; 2014; BlackRock 2015).  Beyond the 
portfolio illiquidity resulting from the sheer size of these managers—which are essentially forced 
to hold concentrated long-term positions in all, or nearly all major companies—the use of index-
based strategies directly precludes discretionary exits from underperforming firms, rather 
requiring an indefinite buy-and-hold orientation.  Consequently, as noted by Hawley and 
Williams (2000) of index-based funds generally, they have been more or less forced into 
“voice”-based corporate governance activism as the only avenue to uphold fiduciary duty (Appel 
et al. 2016).  According to BlackRock’s global head of corporate governance: “There was a time 
when investors would give companies the benefit of the doubt, but there is much less tolerance 
now….we are big investors and can't simply sell the shares, even if we wanted to” (Armitstead 
2012).  Similarly, the second-largest passive manager, $3.1 trillion AUM Vanguard, has pushed 
firms to create institutional mechanisms for ongoing engagement with “significant, long-term 
investors” (McNabb, 2015).  Noting that “we are 5% of most companies” (Grind and Lubin 
2015), its CEO recently said of these that:  
“We’re going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings target. And we’ll 
hold it when you don’t…We’re going to hold your stock when everyone else is piling in. 
And when everyone else is running for the exits. That is precisely why we care so much 
about good governance.” (William McNabb III, quoted in Appel et al. 2016, p. 111). 
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4. Neoliberalism, Globalization and the Resurgence of State Capitalism 
In the context of global financial market integration, this dialectical overshooting and 
retrenchment of monitoring and control system costs—to the extent that its latter phase produces 
a shift towards stable, voice-based shareholder relationships—constitutes a potentially powerful 
motor for global company network formation.  However, this dynamic is likely to be limited to 
the more highly developed core regions of the global financial system (e.g. the US and parts of 
Western Europe), where markets are both relatively liquid and efficient, and highly integrated 
with one another.  In contrast, in the more peripheral and underdeveloped reaches of the global 
financial system (e.g. with poor investor protection), the drive to liquidity and efficiency is 
unlikely to develop enough initial momentum for participation in this particular global network 
formation process.  This does not mean that these peripheral regions have been cut-off from 
global company network formation.  However, their network integration, we argue, is primarily 
being driven by the intersection of two other, more classically Polanyian double movements 
within financial marketization.  These are centered on the dilemmas of security and sovereignty 
(figure 1) associated with the advance of neoliberalization and globalization.   
Whereas the evolutionary drive to liquidity and efficiency in the Anglo-American world 
appears to have become exhausted under the weight of its own contradictions, the political 
impulses towards neoliberalization and globalization continue to show substantial international 
momentum (see Peck et al. 2012).  As predicted by Polanyi, however, their advance has been 
accompanied by a society-protecting institutional countermovement whose structure is in many 
respects antithetical to the logic of marketization.  Most important, from the standpoint of global 
company network formation, is the dramatic rise of “state capitalist” institutional forms, not as a 
reaction to neoliberalism and globalization, but rather as a means for sustaining them.   
For the present analysis, we employ Peck et al.’s (2012) understanding of neoliberalism 
as “market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring.”  Crucially, it is this “disciplinary” impulse that, 
in Polanyi’s model, gives the liberal project its chimerical character, due to the political 
impossibility of allowing society to be “transformed into a heap of ruins” by the “sanction of 
hunger” (Polanyi 2001, p. 204 and 123).  As noted by Polanyi, this paradox (“dilemma of 
security” in figure 1) is particularly stark with respect to the financial and monetary system, due 
to its critical transactional role within the economy.  The result is an inevitable coupling of 
market disciplinary reforms (e.g. the Gold Standard) to the growth of financial backstopping 
institutions (“provision of security” in figure 1), which, in both the classical liberal and 
neoliberal eras, has most importantly taken the form of an expansion of the sovereign balance 
sheet (via central banking, bailouts, etc.).  In the neoliberal era, the most important financial 
manifestation of the market disciplinary impulse has been a minimalist regulatory approach, 
founded on the faith that actors will behave responsibly out of a fear of losses from risky 
behavior.  As noted by Minsky and Ferri (1992) this approach is flawed due not only to the 
inability of actors to evaluate risks, but also their knowledge that the state will inevitably be, as 
emphasized by Polanyi, forced to absorb risks in a crisis.  The result has been an expansion of 
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“big government” finance under the auspices of small-government ideology, in an escalating 
cycle of crises and crisis-interventions (Crotty 2009; Konigs 2015).   
This state financial expansion is remarkably pervasive internationally.  However, it 
exhibits substantial detailed international variations, which we argue are largely explained by its 
interaction with the “dilemma of sovereignty” (figure 1) created by globalization.  The 
discussion of “globalization” in this context is complex, given that elements of it (like 
“financialization”) can be subsumed within the neoliberal market disciplinary project.  However, 
to the extent that globalization is understood broadly as international economic integration, it is 
also conditioned by a second double-movement.  This is driven by the profit/growth-seeking 
impulse to pursue cross-border trade and investment opportunities, and the reciprocal pressure 
this creates to establish “sovereignty instruments” (figure 1) to protect economic policy 
autonomy from foreign intrusions and dependency (see Rodrik 2011).  Crucially, this is not 
simply a question of market-society relations, but also the position of states within international 
power relations.  In the major reserve-currency issuing economies, the moral hazard surrounding 
the expansion of central bank balance sheets, and routine bailouts of key financial institutions, is 
essentially a domestic political issue.  For developing and or small economies, though—which 
must conduct international operations in foreign currencies which their central banks cannot 
backstop—a reactive cycle of crisis and bailout, driven largely by overseas regulatory failures, 
poses an existential threat to national independence.  With withdrawal from global financial 
markets mostly impossible—at least to the extent countries wish to be integrated into global 
trade and direct investment flows—the result has been a pattern of “big government” financial 
development which is both more calculated, and more internationally extroverted, than that in 
the core economies (Aizenmann 2007; Clark and Monk 2010).   
The most important aspect of this has been a dramatic relegitimization of state ownership.  
Above all, this is a strategy of sovereign self-insurance, with foreign currency reserve assets 
offsetting balance of payments risk, and state ownership of key banks preemptively guaranteeing 
domestic financial liquidity and solvency.  This behavior has been particularly prevalent among 
Asian states seeking to avoid a repeat of the 1997/1998 financial crisis, and oil and gas exporters 
seeking to avoid a repeat of the early 1980s debt and commodity price crises (Aizenmann 2007; 
Clark et al. 2013).  Importantly, however, the contemporary state capitalist defense of social 
security and national sovereignty is not typically an outright attack on market-disciplinary 
regulatory restructuring or global economic integration.  Rather, it seeks to achieve a balanced 
synthesis of these competing impulses.   
Somewhat ironically, state ownership is one of the most globalization and liberalization-
friendly interventionist instruments, insofar as it neither directly obstructs the operation of 
market forces, nor is limited by the confines of state territoriality (Haberly 2011).  Particularly 
outstanding, in this respect, are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which are typically created to 
harness foreign exchange and or pension reserve assets for more productive policy objectives 
(Clark et al. 2013).  Increasingly, this involves the pursuit of a “double bottom line” in which 
states seek to deploy SWF assets in a manner that is both profitable, and more broadly beneficial 
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to the national economy (Clark et al. 2013).  Domestically, SWFs are often used as holding 
companies charged with imparting a commercial, market-disciplined orientation into semi-
privatized state owned enterprises (SOEs), or as venture capital funds providing support to 
private firms.  Internationally, they often purchase stakes in foreign partner firms as a globally-
oriented strategy of asserting national development policy autonomy, with the result being a 
growth of “state-led global alliance capitalist” networks both within and cutting across multiple 
developed and developing economies (Haberly 2011).  Most interestingly, the “double bottom-
line” fund, and its associated state capitalist network sprawl, has increasingly spread beyond 
commodity exporters and developing countries, to larger developed countries with historically 
strong interventionist streaks.  These have launched new ”strategic” SWFs (e.g. France and 
Italy), and retooled existing entities (e.g. holding companies and pension funds) into SWF-like 
investors, as part of efforts to manage the progress and impacts of neoliberalization and 
globalization (see section 7).   
 
5. Mapping “Earth Incorporated” 
As described above, these Veblenian and Polanyian double-movements conditioning the 
institutionalization of contemporary financial marketization appear to be desynchronized, insofar 
as the drive to liquidity and efficiency shows signs of unraveling even while the political 
impulses towards neoliberalization and globalization continue to advance.  However, both have, 
in their current configuration, conspired to produce a similar shift away from fragmented and 
arm’s-length corporate control, towards more centralized networks of long-term voice-based 
control.   As we show in the next two sections, these tendencies have produced a concentrically 
organized global company network, consisting of a “global network core” of Anglo-American 
fund managers, ringed by a “state capitalist periphery” extending heterogeneously across non-
Anglo American economies.   
The methodology used here differs from previous studies of global corporate ownership, 
which have employed one of two approaches.  The first is the construction of investor rankings 
by total assets controlled, which does not shed any direct light on network structure (Peetz and 
Murray 2012).  The second is the classification of general topological features in networks of 
thousands of firms, linked by a myriad of weak as well as strong ties (Vitali et al. 2011).  These 
have shed general light on global company network structure; however, the very massiveness of 
their scope, and lack of data filtering or reduction, renders the most important network features 
largely unintelligible.  With both the contributions and shortcomings of these studies in mind, we 
employ a more targeted methodology, mapping the ultimate 5% control tree of the 205 public 
and private firms, worldwide, identified based on the Forbes Global 2000 list and Orbis to have 
more than $50 billion in 2014 sales.  In addition to reflecting the minimum reliable disclosure 
threshold, restricting our analysis to block holdings in major firms allows for a relatively 
unclouded view of key network features, and helps us to draw conclusions about the relational 
character of ties.  With respect to the latter, the fact that concentrated stakes in very large firms 
are extremely difficult to sell quickly, implies a certain level of long-term commitment, and in all 
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likelihood managerial engagement.  In addition to revealing the direct ownership of firms, our 
approach seeks to trace—through as many layers as necessary, until ultimate owners are 
reached—structures of control as defined by concentrated, 5% stakes.  For each investor, we 
define the total sales of sample firms lying within this 5% control pyramid as an “economic 
footprint,” thus highlighting influence over the “real economy” rather than simply financial 
wealth.  Ownership data is derived from a combination of SEC def-14A filings, company 
websites and reports, and Orbis searches, with data the most recent available as of June 2015.   
 
Figure 2. International Structure of the Global Company Network 
Figure 2 shows the global company network’s structure at a nationally aggregated level.  
The extent of network integration is very high, with 74% (152) of 205 sample firms connected to 
the global company network (as defined by firms themselves, or any of their 5% ultimate block 
holders, being linked by 5% share blocks).  Of these 74%, 32% (48) have a direct foreign block 
holder, with the remaining 68% connected to the global network via firms in their own home 
country.  There is substantial international variation in network integration.  Ironically, given the 
historical fame of its company network, Germany has the most disarticulated control structures 
of any major economy.  Conversely, the US and UK—which have traditionally been bastions of 
fragmented and decentralized control—are tightly integrated both internally and internationally.  
The most tightly integrated major economies are South Korea and China, where 100% of sample 
firms are substantially owned by their respective governments, and thus linked to both one 
another and the global network.  Also strongly integrated are the French and Japanese company 
networks, where state ownership is likewise influential.  In term of international influence, 
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American investors are overwhelmingly dominant, holding 59 share blocks in foreign firms
7
, or 
more than four times the total (14) for second-ranked UK.  In third place after the UK is 
Singapore, whose SWFs and other state-linked investors hold seven blocks in foreign firms, 
followed by Qatar and Belgium (5), Switzerland, Canada, and France (4), Japan and Germany 
(3), and Abu Dhabi, Brazil, and Norway (2).   
This preliminary analysis supports the idea of a two-part, concentric global company 
network.  This has a tightly integrated core that is centered, counterintuitively, on those Anglo-
American economies historically seen to have the most liquid and decentralized corporate 
control arrangements.  Meanwhile, comprising most of the network’s remainder is a periphery of 
internationally and nationally-oriented state investors, within which a handful of small SWF-
owning states play an outsized role.  In the following sections we examine this network in more 
detail, looking first at the “global network core” before turning to the “state capitalist periphery.”  
 
6. The Global Network Core 
Our results indicate that control of the world economy’s commanding heights is much 
more concentrated than any study has revealed to date.  The 20 most influential world investors 
by “economic footprint” (table 1) are direct and ultimate 5% block holders in 56% and 61% of 
sample firms respectively.  15 of these 20, moreover, are direct 5% block holders in one another, 
with the global company network thus having an exceedingly compact interconnected nucleus 
(figure 3).  This nucleus, which we dub the “global network core,” is nearly two orders of 
magnitude smaller than the 1000-member “strongly connected core” of the global control 
network identified by Vitali et al. (2011).   
Seven of these 15 mutually-invested network core members are based in the United 
States.  This American dominance stems directly from the tendency of passive fund management 
to produce concentrated patterns of control, with the two largest US passive managers, 
BlackRock and Vanguard, having vastly larger direct 5% control footprints than any other 
investors worldwide.  The geography of this pattern reflects the paradoxical logic of the 
“Veblenian double movement” in financial market organization, wherein the drive towards 
market liquidity and efficiency ultimately breaks down under the weight of its own institutional 
contradictions.  As noted by Jessop and Kumar (2014), the fact that US securities markets have 
traditionally been the world’s most efficient—implying a corresponding paucity of opportunities 
for arbitrage—has encouraged an earlier and more pronounced shift by US than European fund 
managers to passive investment.  Given the economies of scale of this strategy, the result has 
been a greater tendency towards fund management consolidation in the US.  Indeed, contrary to 
the stereotype of dispersed ownership, our analysis shows that the US has one of the more 
centralized and incestuous control patterns of any advanced economy.  67% of US sample firms 
lie within BlackRock’s ultimate control pyramid, in most cases via direct 5% shareholdings.  
Furthermore, all but two US firms for which Blackrock is a 5% shareholder also have Vanguard 
                                                          
7
 Defined as both sample firms, and their ultimate 5% block holders.   
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as a 5% shareholder (and vice versa), with these two passive managers thus owning 10-15% of 
more than half of America’s largest firms.  Finally, BlackRock and Vanguard’s ownership 
structures are also entangled with both one another, and that of the third largest US passive 
manager, State Street (figure 3) 
 
Table 1. Top 20 world investors by “economic footprint” (ultimate 5% portfolio firm sales) 
Investor City Type** 
Direct 
Portfolio  
Sales ($B)† 
Ultimate 
Portfolio 
Sales ($B)‡ 
Direct Sales 
as % 
Sample† 
Ultimate 
Sales as % 
Sample‡ 
Direct 
Portfolio 
firms† 
(#) 
Ultimate 
Portfolio 
Firms‡ 
(#) 
Dir. Firms as 
% Sample† 
Ult. Firms 
as %  of 
Sample‡ 
BlackRock Net           
Norway Govt. Oslo Govt. 321 9728 1.5% 46.2% 2 93 1.0% 45.4% 
BlackRock NYC  Pass. FM 6312 9633 30.0% 45.8% 57 92 27.3% 44.9% 
Vanguard Phil. Pass. FM 4278 9633 20.3% 45.8% 40 92 19.1% 44.9% 
Wellington Phil. Act. FM 339 9633 1.6% 45.8% 4 92 1.9% 44.9% 
PNC Financial Pitt. Bank 0 9633 0.0% 45.8% 0 92 0.0% 44.9% 
Canada Net.           
Desmarais  Mont. Family 0 2781 0.0% 13.2% 0 26 0.0% 12.4% 
Can. Bk Net* Toronto Financial 121 2682 0.6% 12.7% 1 25 0.5% 12.0% 
Capital Group Los Ang Act. FM 1448 2475 6.8% 11.8% 18 26 8.6% 12.7% 
China Govt. Beijing Govt. 2378 2378 11.2% 11.3% 20 20 9.6% 9.8% 
State Str. Net.           
State Street Boston Pass. FM 1325 1971 6.3% 9.4% 14 21 6.7% 12.7% 
T .Rowe Price Balti. Act. FM 445 1971 2.1% 9.4% 5 21 2.4% 12.2% 
Japan Net.           
Japan Govt. Tokyo Govt. 321 1932 1.5% 9.2% 3 22 1.4% 10.7% 
JTSB* Tokyo Trust Bk 960 1716 4.6% 8.2% 12 20 5.7% 9.8% 
SMFG* Tokyo Bank 254 1716 1.2% 8.2% 3 20 1.4% 9.8% 
Resona Tokyo Bank 0 1716 0.0% 8.2% 0 20 0.0% 9.8% 
JP Morgan NYC Bank 1001 1585 4.8% 7.5% 10 16 4.8% 7.8% 
Qatar Govt. Doha Govt. 651 1311 3.1% 6.2% 5 11 2.4% 5.4% 
MUFJ* Tokyo Bank 0 1150 0.0% 5.5% 8 13 3.8% 6.3% 
FMR Network           
Johnsons Boston Family 746 948 3.5% 4.5% 7 9 3.3% 4.4% 
Fidelity Inv. Boston Act. FM 746 948 3.5% 4.5% 7 9 3.3% 4.4% 
*Canadian Bank Network, Japan Trustee Services Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
**Active versus passive fund manager (FM) defined based on predominant strategy by AUM. 
†Firms in which investor is a direct 5% shareholder. 
‡Firms lying within 5% ultimate control pyramid of investor. 
Source: Company Financial Reports and Websites, SEC def14-A filings, Orbis 
 
Figure 3. The Global Network Core (mutually-invested top-20 world investors) 
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Figure 4. Global Company Network, late 2014 - early 2015 
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At the international level, the largest US passive manager, BlackRock, is by far the most 
influential actor in global network integration.  As can be seen in table 1 and figure 4, BlackRock 
holds a direct 5% stake in nearly a third of sales-weighted sample firms worldwide, a proportion 
which rises to 45% for its ultimate 5% pyramid.  Outside of the US, Blackrock’s footprint is 
most concentrated in the UK, where 92% of sample firms lie within its 5% pyramid.  Given that 
the UK has historically had the most liquid and efficient securities markets in Europe (indeed 
BlackRock’s current shape resulted from its 2009 acquisition of Barclays Global Investors), this 
pattern is congruent with the Veblenian double movement theorized here.  This model is also 
supported by the concentration of BlackRock’s non-Anglo-American holdings in financial 
multinationals with large free floats and US listings or quotations8 (e.g. Deutsche Bank, AXA, 
UBS, BBVA, ING, Zurich Financial, Mitsubishi UFJ).  The high domestic and international 
influence of these in-turn helps to enroll 29% of non-US and UK sample firms in BlackRock’s 
ultimate control pyramid.   
A crucial question is whether this centralization of control is leading to the type of long-
term macro-economic outlook, on the part of “universal owners” (Hawley and Williams 2000), 
which would be expected given their internalization of what smaller investors would consider to 
be externalities.  It is too early to definitely resolve this question; however, available evidence 
suggests that its answer is a tentative yes.  The tendency towards increasing domestic and 
international shareholder activism among the largest US fund managers is unmistakable (Appel 
et al. 2016; Armitstead 2012).  However, the nature of this activism is different from traditional 
Anglo-American activists such as hedge funds.  In a 2015 letter to Fortune-500 CEOs, 
BlackRock’s CEO scathingly repudiated the prevailing “short-termist” emphasis of activists on 
draining firms of cash.  Rather, he endorsed a retain-and-reinvest governance model in which 
firms make “big, long-term bets that create jobs and keep an economy on top of the innovation 
curve” (Fink 2015).  In early 2016, Fink sent a similar letter to the CEOs of the largest European 
firms (Landgraf 2016).  Significantly, the largest US fund managers, including BlackRock and 
Vanguard, have distanced themselves from the proxy advisory firms that have traditionally 
helped hedge funds to mobilize shareholder support for buybacks and other “short-termist” 
measures.  Ironically, whereas the formerly “passive” approaches of large fund managers to 
corporate governance would have entailed automatic support for such proposals, their newly 
“activist” orientation has increasingly involved the defense of firms from them (Charan and 
Colvin 2015; Coffee 2015; Craig 2013; Economist 2015a; Lublin and Grind 2013; Sawyer and 
Aquilla 2013).   
How this tension between conventional and “patient” shareholder activism will play out 
in the US and elsewhere is unclear.  In the most prominent direct clash between activist hedge 
funds and the big-three US passive fund managers, DuPont successfully defeated, with support 
from BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, a proxy advisor-backed activist hedge fund ballot, 
which aimed to replace the firm’s board to pave the way for radical restructuring (Brownstein et 
                                                          
8
 This underscores the key role of the New York capital market specifically in global company network formation.  
A comprehensive city-level analysis of this network is a clear direction for research extension.   
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al. 2015; Charan and Colvin 2015; Coffee 2015).  However, just a few months after it fended off 
this attack, DuPont’s own board proceeded to oust the firm’s CEO, in order to pursue a merger 
with Dow, and subsequent breakup of the combined firm (Bunge 2015; Crooks 2015).  It 
remains to be seen whether the first or second half of this episode is the more important 
bellwether. 
 
7. The State Capitalist Periphery 
Out of the 27% of sample firms which are linked to the global company network, but do 
not lie within BlackRock’s 5% control pyramid, two thirds have a direct 5% state block holder.  
Consequently, the two-part classification of global company network structure into global 
network core, and state capitalist periphery, can be said to be more or less exhaustive (keeping in 
mind that this excludes the 26% of sample firms not linked to the global network).  Figure 5 
shows all ultimately state-invested portions of the global company network (excluding, for 
clarity, those only ultimately state-invested via BlackRock).  This state capitalist presence is 
broadly dominated by SWFs and other state institutional investors—belonging, most 
importantly, to Qatar, Singapore, France, China, Japan and S. Korea—thus embodying the rise of 
the market-conforming, financial-return oriented state capitalist paradigm discussed in section 4.   
Whereas the formation of the global network core reflects a Veblenian double-movement 
of market structural evolution, the state capitalist periphery has been shaped into its current form 
by politically-mediated Polanyian double-movements of marketization and societal-protection, 
surrounding the advance of neoliberalism and globalization.  As noted in Haberly (2011; 2014), 
these double-movements operate at not only a national, but also a transnational level, with the 
latter epitomized by the role of the global financial crisis in driving an expansion of the “small 
state” SWF-centered networks in figure 5 (notably Singapore, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Norway).  
On the one hand, the growth of these SWFs constitutes a proactive attempt by owning states to 
insulate themselves from overseas economic shocks in a way broadly congruent, rather than 
contradictory, with global neoliberal market logics.  However, these funds have also proven to be 
important liquid shock absorbers for host economies, playing an early leading role in crisis 
recapitalizations of western banks and automotive firms.  Directly catalyzing these politically 
sensitive investments was a complementarity between the desire of host states to attract foreign 
support for crisis-stricken firms, and the desire of investing states to both take advantage of steep 
share discounts, and build political capital with host states and developmental partner firms 
(Haberly 2011; 2014; Hatton and Pistor 2011; Yeung 2011).  Many of these recapitalizations 
established durable relationships—notably with Citigroup, Unicredit, UBS, Barclays, 
Volkswagen, BlackRock (via bank asset sales), and, more recently, Deutsche Bank (figure 5)—
which have blurred the boundary between “state capitalist periphery” and “global network core.”   
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Figure 5. State Capital in the Global Company Network 
Figures 2 and 5 also underscore the extent to which SWF-capitalism has emerged from 
more nationally-bounded double-movements.  Intriguingly, state financial-investor-anchored 
national company networks appear to be an increasingly universal outcome of the attempts of 
traditionally dirigiste states to manage the advance of liberalization and globalization, even 
where these states have no tradition of widespread state ownership per se.  Most striking, with 
respect to the latter, is the manner in which Japan and South Korea have stumbled into pervasive 
state capitalism as a component of the liberalizing “post-developmental state” (Wong 2004).  In 
Polanyian dialectical fashion, this combines market-disciplinary restructuring of traditional 
conglomerates and business networks, with an expansion of the welfare state to absorb social 
support functions traditionally delegated to business.  Increasingly, state pension funds have 
emerged as a focal point within not only the social-security, but also neoliberal disciplinary sides 
of this dialectic, via their role in promoting capital market development and corporate 
governance reform.  In Japan, the Abe administration has sought to retool the $1.1 trillion dollar 
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Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) into a battering ram to promote a more open 
regime of fiduciary-oriented asset management and corporate governance, as part of its “third 
arrow” structural reforms (Shinn, 2015).  Although GPIF’s portfolio is hidden behind the 
custodial Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) (figure 5), the most recent reports from GPIF and 
JTSB, from year-end 2013 to year-end 2014, indicate that GPIF accounts for more than half of 
JTSB’s custodial stock portfolio, and over 6% of the entire Japanese stock market.  To date, 
Korea’s National Pension Service (NPS)—which very visibly dominates national equity markets 
(figure 5)—has not been enrolled as aggressively in policy, rather more passively promoting 
capital market and asset management development.  However, its growth has raised hopes that it 
will be used to promote a similar corporate reform agenda, at the expense of South Korea’s 
family oligarchs (Jung and Mundy 2014).   
In contrast to Japan and South Korea, France and China both have longstanding traditions 
of widespread state ownership.  As such, they have converged on a pervasive blurring of the 
boundary between public and private sectors from the opposite direction of partial and or 
simulated SOE privatizations, wherein the state imparts a commercial/global orientation into 
firms while keeping them under its protective umbrella (Schmidt 2003; Walter and Howie 2011).  
In both states, various permutations of this Polanyian balancing act have increasingly been 
delegated to SWFs and SWF-like investors.  In China, as can be seen in figure 5, the largest 
SWF (CIC) is mostly a national bank holding company, which has simultaneously served as a 
conduit for repeated preemptive bailouts—averting potentially severe crises stemming from 
ineffective bank regulation—and been charged with imparting a commercial orientation into 
lenders in conjunction with partial privatizations (Walter and Howie 2011).  These 
recapitalizations have been conducted using dollar forex reserves, thus making CIC, in 
conjunction with its overseas asset portfolio (e.g. Morgan Stanley, Noble), a direct link between 
China’s international financial sovereignty and domestic financial security.  Meanwhile, in 
France, an even more pervasive “SWFification” of SOE governance has unfolded via the 
retooling of the flagship holding company APE (“France” in figure 5) along institutional investor 
lines, with funds from partial SOE divestments being reinvested in private-sector firms (APE 
2013).  These investments have not only been made by APE (e.g. in Peugeot), but also a new 
SWF (FSI) and investment bank (BPI) (APE 2013; Levy 2011).  Crucially, a financial return 
orientation allows these investors to navigate the “distinction between government financial 
intervention and straightforward state aid” (APE 2013, p. 26) within market disciplinary EU 
regulations, thus allowing them to support the global expansion of firms, and protect them from 
bankruptcy or foreign takeovers.   
Due to the positive-sum nature of network integration, national state capitalist networks 
contribute to global company network consolidation insofar as they are inwardly-invested by the 
global network core.  However, they have also become outwardly internationalized, with the 
state’s role as an investor creating a non-territorial basis for not only network cohesion, but also 
extension via equity-reinforced alliances with foreign firms.  As noted in Haberly (2011), this 
state-led global alliance capitalism is a characteristic compromise within industries under tension 
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between the pressure for global integration and consolidation, and the desire of multiple 
governments to assert sovereignty over a sector seen as strategically important.  This tension is 
notably reflected in figure 5 in the minority interlocks between BP and Russian state-controlled 
Rosneft, and Nissan and French state-controlled Renault, as well as the 2014 Sino-French state 
co-rescue (via Dongfeng and APE) of family-owned Peugeot.   
 
8. Conclusion: The Future of the Global Company Network 
Notwithstanding the political inertia exhibited by neoliberalism, recent years have 
witnessed an evaporation of the air of inevitably once surrounding the broader advance of global 
“market rule” (Peck et al. 2012; Rodrik 2011).  The consolidation of the global company 
network can in many respects be seen as a microcosm of this uncertainty and instability.  Seen 
from one perspective, this network is a culminating feature of global financial integration; 
however, at a deeper level, it appears to be both emerging out of and contributing to an 
unraveling of the familiar “market rule” trajectory of integration under the weight of its own 
contradictions. 
 
Indeed, as this network has formed, it has become questionable whether global 
finance can still be characterized, fundamentally, as a marketplace.  On the one hand, the 
advance of neoliberalism and globalization is increasingly embedded in an expansion of states 
themselves into markets as investors.  In this respect, the paradoxically dirigiste character of 
“laissez faire” noted by Polanyi has become ever-more glaring.  On the other hand, the basic 
fabric of the core capital markets in global finance has begun to fray with the rise of an 
overhead-minimizing strategy of passive fund management.  As ever-increasing funds have 
come to flow through a very small group of passive funds, these have come to comprise a de 
facto permanent governing board for a growing share of major global companies.   
There is some reason to believe that this architecture is fundamentally unstable, and may 
be forced to undergo unpredictable transformations almost as quickly as it emerges.  Two 
tensions stand out as particularly prominent.  Firstly, although the exhaustion of the “drive to 
liquidity and efficiency” can be primarily understood as a bottom-up “Veblenian” phenomenon, 
the centralized network arrangements resulting from it are increasingly at odds with the 
Polanyian market disciplinary political impulse.  Specifically, ever-larger fund managers are 
increasingly trapped in a paradox between the need to play an active corporate governance role 
commensurate with their size, and the potential abyss of anti-trust action.  In this respect, 
managers such as BlackRock and Vanguard are at risk of following in the footsteps of JP 
Morgan’s “Money Trust.”  This conflict may not come to a head given the paradoxical 
dependence of passive funds on a surrounding ecosystem of market fluidity and speculation 
(although Morgan, notably, had a similar ecological dependence, see De Long 1992).  However, 
in the US and UK in particular, an unabated movement towards de facto mega-trusts would 
eventually force the issue (see Azar et al. 2016 and Economist 2015b).  The result would be a 
pressure for either a breakup of these networks, or an enrollment of their key intermediaries into 
a role as quasi-public financial utilities.  The first scenario would see the Polanyian market-
disciplinary impulse assert itself over the Veblenian double-movement, whereas the second 
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would see the latter, in essence, coopted by the Polanyian countermovement.  This would entail 
the emergence of what Streeck (2010) describes, in Polanyian terms, as an “organized” company 
network embedded in a matrix of compulsory societal obligations.   
Even if these looming anti-trust issues can be resolved, however, enrolling such massive 
actors into public service would be likely to intensify the second tension within the global 
company network, namely the tendency for national Polanyian countermovements to precipitate 
international conflict.  In this respect, the experience of Google—whose status as a US para-
public monopoly (e.g. via security state enrollment) has rendered it increasingly unwelcome 
abroad—appears to be instructive.  What this illustrates more than anything is the extent to 
which globalization’s stability rests on the thinly veiled fiction of market depoliticization.  In the 
absence of this fiction, private competitive struggles tend to devolve into public political 
struggles, which in turn threaten the basic machinery of cross-border market integration.  The 
contemporary internationalization of state capitalism is a particularly striking development in 
this respect.  For the time being, this appears to have a stabilizing influence on the world 
economy, as it helps to cement tacit or explicit forms of state-state and state-firm cooperation, 
which tame the vicissitudes of market fluctuations.  In the long-run, however, the replacement of 
the ostensibly depoliticized hand of the market with the visible hand of transnational state 
partnerships is likely to render global finance sensitive to the vicissitudes of power politics.  It 
remains to be seen whether the 21
st
 century world economy will prove more resilient to such 
tensions than the early 20
th
 century world economy.   
Looking forward to future research on the geographically “variegated” institutional 
development of global capitalism (Peck and Theodore 2007), our findings underscore the need to 
complement politically-oriented analysis, with data-grounded analysis of emergent evolutionary 
change at the level of agent populations.  We have primarily examined this evolution from the 
standpoint of financial investors and intermediaries.  However, this ultimately needs to be 
coupled to analyses of competitive selection processes acting on firms in the real economy (see 
Haberly 2014).  In this context, Veblen’s focus on the institutionally-mediated tension between 
financial pecuniary rationality, and the organizational logic of industrial society—updated for the 
post-industrial age—is likely to prove even more fruitful conceptually.  With respect to the 
geographic ontology of such work, the Global Financial Network (GFN) framework of Coe et al. 
(2014) is a potentially useful integrating template for “forensic” empirical investigations of 
global financial institutional subsystems.  However, there is also a need to adapt the 
“glocalizing” frame of GFN to the apparent Polanyian dialectical resurgence of the nation-state, 
while avoiding the pitfalls of either crude analytical nationalism or paralyzing ontological 
complexity.  Finally, a notable omission from our analysis, which can be incorporated into future 
work, are the systemic dynamics of capital accumulation.  This is particularly significant in 
relation to “financialization,” which may encompass a third, accumulation-driven logic—
conditioned by the long-term cyclical saturation of investment opportunities (see Arrighi and 
Silver 2001)—beyond the two institutional logics postulated here.  World Systems theorists 
(Arrighi 1994), notably, have provided rich analyses of this understanding of financialization in 
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relation to the interplay between world economy-making and state-making, and the Polanyian 
double movement.  A geographically nuanced engagement with this work is a promising 
developmental path for the institutionalist model outlined here, and the GFN project. 
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